Details about Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Access statistics for papers by Wolfgang Pesendorfer.

Last updated 2009-09-11. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: ppe7

Working Papers

2008

1. Measurable Ambiguity
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics

2007

2. A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in Elections
   Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics
3. Competitive Redistricting
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics
4. Strategic Redistricting
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics
5. The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
6. The Revealed Preference Implications of Reference Dependent Preferences
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics
7. The War of Information
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics

2006

8. Behavioral Economics Comes of Age
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
9. Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent
   Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
   Also in Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine (1996)
10. Partisan Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
11. The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
    Also in NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org (2005) View citations
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2005) View citations
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2005) View citations

2005

12. A Simple Theory of Temptation and Self-Control
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
13. Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
14. Random Expected Utility
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
    Also in Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers, David K. Levine (2002)
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2006)
15. The Case for Mindless Economics
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations

2004

16. Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters
    Theory workshop papers, UCLA Department of Economics

2003

17. Self-control, revealed preference and consumption choice
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in Review of Economic Dynamics (2004)

2000

18. Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
19. Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2001)
20. Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice
    Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University View citations
    Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (1998) View citations
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (2000)
    See also Journal Article in Review of Economic Studies (2003)

1999

21. Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
    Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University View citations
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2004)
22. Temptation and Self-Control
    Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2001)

1998

23. Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine
    Also in Working Papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM (1998)

1996

24. Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations
25. Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations
26. Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2000)
27. When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1998)

1995

28. The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (1997)
29. The Swing Voter's Curse
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1996)
30. When Are Agents Negligible?
    Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
    Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (1992) View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1995)

1994

31. Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (1997)

1993

32. Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1995)

1992

33. Reputation in Dynamic Games
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1996)
34. Sovereign Debt: Forgiving and Forgetting Reconsidered
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science View citations

1991

35. Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1995)

Journal Articles

2009

1. A Comment on Bernheim's Appraisal of Neuroeconomics
   American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009, 1, (2), 42-47
2. Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (1), 146-174

2007

3. Harmful Addiction
   Review of Economic Studies, 2007, 74, (1), 147-172 View citations
4. The evolution of cooperation through imitation
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 58, (2), 293-315 View citations
5. Welfare without Happiness
   American Economic Review, 2007, 97, (2), 471-476 View citations

2006

6. Behavioral Economics Comes of Age: A Review Essay on Advances in Behavioral Economics
   Journal of Economic Literature, 2006, 44, (3), 712-721 View citations
7. Random Expected Utility
   Econometrica, 2006, 74, (1), 121-146 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2005)

2005

8. Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 121, (2), 259-272 View citations
9. Second Reply to Coelho, Klein, and McClure
   Econ Journal Watch, 2005, 2, (1), 42-46
10. The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes
    Review of Economic Studies, 2005, 72, (2), 429-448 View citations

2004

11. Response to “Fashion Cycles in Economics”
    Econ Journal Watch, 2004, 1, (3), 455-464 View citations
12. Self Control, Revealed Preferences and Consumption Choice
    Review of Economic Dynamics, 2004, 7, (2), 243-264 View citations
    See also Working Paper (2003)
13. Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
    Econometrica, 2004, 72, (1), 119-158 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1999)

2003

14. Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice
    Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 70, (2), 417-437 View citations
    See also Working Paper (2000)

2001

15. Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, 100, (1), 1-21 View citations
    See also Working Paper (2000)
16. Temptation and Self-Control
    Econometrica, 2001, 69, (6), 1403-1435 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1999)

2000

17. Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions
    American Economic Review, 2000, 90, (3), 499-525 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1998

18. When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, 79, (1), 46-71 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1997

19. The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
    Econometrica, 1997, 65, (6), 1247-1282 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1995)
20. Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information
    Econometrica, 1997, 65, (5), 1029-1058 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1994)

1996

21. Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent
    Econometrica, 1996, 64, (3), 691-704 View citations
22. Reputation in Dynamic Games
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 70, (1), 109-132 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1992)
23. The Swing Voter's Curse
    American Economic Review, 1996, 86, (3), 408-24 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1995)

1995

24. Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles
    American Economic Review, 1995, 85, (4), 771-92 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1993)
25. Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 65, (1), 79-116 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)
26. When Are Agents Negligible?
    American Economic Review, 1995, 85, (5), 1160-70 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1995)