Details about A. Mitchell Polinsky

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Workplace:	Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by A. Mitchell Polinsky.

Last updated 2008-02-03. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: ppo94

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Working Papers

2006

1. Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

2005

2. A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
3. The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

2004

4. Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
   See Also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (2006)
5. Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts
   Microeconomics, EconWPA
   Also in
   American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings, American Law & Economics Association
   Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics (2003) View citations
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2003) View citations
6. The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
   See Also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2006)

2001

7. A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers
   Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations
   See Also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (2002)
8. Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients
   Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics View citations
   See Also Journal Article in American Law and Economics Review (2003)

1999

9. Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
   Also in
   Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics (1999) View citations
   See Also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2001)
10. The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Literature (2000)

1997

11. On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in Journal of Legal Studies (1999)

1994

12. Should Employees be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability
    NBER Reprints, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (1993)

1993

13. A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    See Also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1991)
14. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1991)
15. Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in Journal of Law & Economics (1992)
16. Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1996)
17. Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

1992

18. Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

1991

19. A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1991)

1988

20. Optimal Liability when the Injurer's Information about the Victim's Loss is Imperfect
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    See Also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (1987)
21. The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

1987

22. Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    See Also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1987)

1986

23. A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
24. Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

1984

25. Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1982)
26. Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

1982

27. Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    See Also Journal Article in Bell Journal of Economics (1983)
28. The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
    See Also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1984)

1981

29. Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
30. The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines
    NBER Reprints, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    See Also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1979)

1980

31. On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    See Also Journal Article in Economic Inquiry (1980)
32. Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
33. Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

Journal Articles

2006

1. Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe
   International Review of Law and Economics, 2006, 26, (3), 323-335 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (2004)
2. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable
   Journal of Public Economics, 2006, 90, (4-5), 823-835
   See Also Working Paper (2004)

2003

3. Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients
   American Law and Economics Review, 2003, 5, (1), 165-188 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (2001)

2002

4. A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers
   International Review of Law and Economics, 2002, 22, (2), 217-225 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (2001)

2001

5. Corruption and optimal law enforcement
   Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 81, (1), 1-24 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (1999)

2000

6. The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
   Journal of Economic Literature, 2000, 38, (1), 45-76 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (1999)

1999

7. On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence
   Journal of Legal Studies, 1999, 28, (1), 1-16 View citations
   See Also Working Paper (1997)

1998

8. Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?
   Journal of Legal Studies, 1998, 27, (2), 519-35 View citations
   Also in
   Journal of Legal Studies, 1998, 27, (1), 141-57 (1998) View citations
9. On offense history and the theory of deterrence
   International Review of Law and Economics, 1998, 18, (3), 305-324 View citations

1997

10. Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al
    Journal of Legal Studies, 1997, 26, (2), 663-77 View citations

1996

11. Optimal Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, 27, (2), 269-280 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1993)

1993

12. Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1993, 13, (3), 239-257 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1994)

1992

13. Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
    Journal of Law & Economics, 1992, 35, (1), 133-48 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1993)

1991

14. A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among Individuals
    American Economic Review, 1991, 81, (3), 618-21 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1991)
15. A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders
    Journal of Public Economics, 1991, 46, (3), 291-306 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1993)
16. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (4), 562-570 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1993)

1989

17. Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1989, 5, (1), 99-108 View citations

1988

18. The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability
    Journal of Legal Studies, 1988, 17, (1), 151-64 View citations
19. The deterrent effects of settlements and trials
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1988, 8, (1), 109-116 View citations

1987

20. Fixed Price versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1987, 3, (1), 27-46
    See Also Working Paper (1987)
21. Optimal liability when the injurer's information about the victim's loss is imperfect
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1987, 7, (2), 139-147
    See Also Working Paper (1988)

1984

22. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment
    Journal of Public Economics, 1984, 24, (1), 89-99 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1982)

1983

23. Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power
    Bell Journal of Economics, 1983, 14, (2), 581-589 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1982)

1982

24. Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs
    Journal of Public Economics, 1982, 19, (3), 385-394 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1984)

1980

25. On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules
    Economic Inquiry, 1980, 18, (2), 233-46
    See Also Working Paper (1980)
26. Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting
    American Economic Review, 1980, 70, (2), 363-67 View citations
27. The efficiency of paying compensation in the Pigovian solution to externality problems
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1980, 7, (2), 142-148

1979

28. An Empirical Reconciliation of Micro and Grouped Estimates of the Demand for Housing
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1979, 61, (2), 199-205 View citations
29. Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control
    Canadian Journal of Economics, 1979, 12, (1), 75-83 View citations
30. The Demand for Housing: An Empirical Postscript
    Econometrica, 1979, 47, (2), 521-23
31. The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines
    American Economic Review, 1979, 69, (5), 880-91 View citations
    See Also Working Paper (1981)

1978

32. Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area: A reply
    Journal of Public Economics, 1978, 9, (1), 111-112
33. Economics and Law: Discussion
    American Economic Review, 1978, 68, (2), 435-36
34. The long-run effects of a residential property tax and local public services
    Journal of Urban Economics, 1978, 5, (2), 241-262 View citations

1977

35. The Demand for Housing: A Study in Specification and Grouping
    Econometrica, 1977, 45, (2), 447-61 View citations

1976

36. Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area
    Journal of Public Economics, 1976, 5, (1-2), 119-129 View citations

1975

37. The Air Pollution and Property Value Debate
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1975, 57, (1), 100-104 View citations

1972

38. Probabilistic Compensation Criteria
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1972, 86, (3), 407-25 View citations