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Details about Patrick Rey

E-mail:
Homepage:http://www.idei.asso.fr/French/FCv/CvChercheurs/Rey.html
Phone:(33/0) 5 61 12 86 40
Postal address:IDEI Universite Toulouse I 31042 Toulouse Cedex FRANCE
Workplace:Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI) (Institute of Industrial Economics), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Patrick Rey.

Last updated 2007-01-04. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

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Working Papers

2000

  1. Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Downloads View citations

1999

  1. Agency Costs, Firm Behaviour and the Nature of Competition
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Downloads View citations
  2. Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Downloads View citations

1996

  1. The Policy Implications of the Economic Analysis of Vertical Restraints
    European Economy - Economic Papers, Commission of the EC, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) View citations

1994

  1. Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Acces to Credit Markets
    Working Papers, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie View citations
  2. Strategic aspects of vertical delegation
    CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange), CEPREMAP
  3. The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1995)

1993

  1. Short-Term Contracts as a Monitoring Device
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Downloads View citations

1990

  1. Optimal Incentive Schemes and the Coexistence of Debt and Equity
    CEPR Financial Markets Paper, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG

1989

  1. RENEGOTIATION DESIGN UNDER SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
    Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

1988

  1. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND PRODUCERS' COMPETITION
    Working Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper View citations

1987

  1. Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions
    Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics View citations

1986

  1. Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk-neutral agent
    CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange), CEPREMAP View citations

1985

  1. The Logic of Vertical Restraints
    Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics View citations
  2. Vertical Restraints from a Principal-Agent Viewpoint
    Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics View citations

Journal Articles

1998

  1. Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1998, 29, (1), 1-37 Downloads View citations
  2. Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1998, 29, (1), 38-56 Downloads View citations
  3. Pricing Regulation Under Bypass Competition
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1998, 29, (2), 259-279 Downloads View citations

1996

  1. On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
    Econometrica, 1996, 64, (6), 1395-1414 Downloads View citations

1995

  1. The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, 26, (3), 431-451 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1994)

1994

  1. Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
    Econometrica, 1994, 62, (2), 257-82 Downloads View citations

1990

  1. Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment in Contracting
    Econometrica, 1990, 58, (3), 597-619 Downloads View citations
 
 
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