Details about Jan Christoph Schlegel
Access statistics for papers by Jan Christoph Schlegel.
Last updated 2023-09-09. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: psc739
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Working Papers
2023
- Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers
Papers, arXiv.org
- Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding in Transaction Ordering
Papers, arXiv.org
- Would Friedman Burn your Tokens?
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (1)
2022
- On-Chain Auctions with Deposits
Papers, arXiv.org
2021
- Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms
Papers, arXiv.org 
See also Journal Article Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2020) View citations (1) (2020)
- Reallocation with Priorities
Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics View citations (1)
2020
- The Structure of Equilibria in Trading Networks with Frictions
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (8)
See also Journal Article The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions, Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society (2022) View citations (3) (2022)
2019
- Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie View citations (5)
Also in Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie (2017) 
See also Journal Article Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2019) View citations (4) (2019)
2016
- Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie View citations (1)
- Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie View citations (5)
2014
- Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie
2013
- Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment. N.B.: This paper is replaced by Nr 14.05 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result" (August 2014)
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie
Journal Articles
2022
- The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
Theoretical Economics, 2022, 17, (2) View citations (3)
See also Working Paper The Structure of Equilibria in Trading Networks with Frictions, Papers (2020) View citations (8) (2020)
2020
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, 123, (C), 41-53 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms, Papers (2021) (2021)
- Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, 124, (C), 62-81 View citations (3)
2019
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, 184, (C) View citations (4)
See also Working Paper Top Trading Cycles, Consistency, and Acyclic Priorities for House Allocation with Existing Tenants, Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie (2019) View citations (5) (2019)
2018
- A note on ex-ante stable lotteries
Economics Letters, 2018, 164, (C), 90-93 View citations (5)
2015
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result
Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 159, (PA), 552-573 View citations (16)
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