Details about Roman M. Sheremeta
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| Homepage: | http://sites.google.com/site/romansheremeta/
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| Phone: | Office: (714) 744-7604 |
| Postal address: | Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA, 92866, U.S.A. |
| Workplace: | Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, (more information at EDIRC) Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, (more information at EDIRC)
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Access statistics for papers by Roman M. Sheremeta.
Last updated 2013-05-23. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: psh307
Jump to Journal Articles
Working Papers
2013
- Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
- Divided Loyalties or Conditional Cooperation? An experimental study of contributions to multiple public goods
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
- Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
Also in Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2012) View citations (10)
- Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2013) View citations (2)
- Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2012) View citations (4)
- Three-Player Trust Game with Insider Communication
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
Also in Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2013)
- Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
Also in University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. (2011)  Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2013)
- Visibility of Contributors and Cost of Information: An Experiment on Public Goods
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
Also in Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2010) View citations (5)
- You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2013) View citations (1)
2012
- A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (11)
Also in Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism", Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (2012) View citations (7)
- Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
Also in Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2012) View citations (1)
- Building and Rebuilding Trust with Promises and Apologies
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (2)
- Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich View citations (13)
- Do Liars Believe? Beliefs and Other-Regarding Preferences in Sender-Receiver Games
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (2)
- Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects and Individual Preferences in Contests
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (4)
- Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (4)
- Overdissipation and Convergence in Rent-seeking Experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (5)
- Principal-Agent Settings with Random Shocks
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
- Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
Also in Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2010) View citations (9)
See also Journal Article in Economic Inquiry (2013)
- Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, bargaining, and conflict
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
- Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (3)
2011
- (Bad) Luck or (Lack of) Effort?: Comparing Social Sharing Norms between US and Europe
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (2011)
- An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich (2009) View citations (7) Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (2009) View citations (8)
- Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
See also Journal Article in European Economic Review (2012)
- Conflicted Minds: Recalibrational Emotions Following Trust-based Interaction
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
- Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
- Restoring Damaged Trust with Promises, Atonement and Apology
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
- Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (2)
- Trust, Reciprocity and Rules
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
2010
- A generalized Tullock contest
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (5)
See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2011)
- Best-of-Three Contests: Experimental Evidence
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (4)
- Do Investors Trust or Simply Gamble?
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
- ENTRY INTO WINNER-TAKE-ALL AND PROPORTIONAL-PRIZE CONTESTS:AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics View citations (12)
Also in Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2010) View citations (18)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2010)
- Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
- Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
- Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 
Also in Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. (2010) 
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2011)
- Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (3)
- The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich View citations (2)
Also in Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics (2010) View citations (1) Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute (2010) View citations (2)
- The Equivalence of Contests
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (2)
Also in Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. (2009)
2009
- A Laboratory Study of a Multi-Level Trust Game with Communication
Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University
- A generalized Tullock contest and the existence of multiple equilibria
Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS), School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. View citations (1)
- Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (12)
Also in Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University (2009) View citations (4)
See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2010)
- Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (5)
See also Journal Article in Economic Inquiry (2011)
- Cooperation Spillovers in Coordination Games
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (2)
- Endowment Effects in Contests
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2011)
- Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two- Stage Political Contests
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (1)
- Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute View citations (8)
See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2010)
- Multi-Level Trust Game with “Insider” Communication
Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
- Reducing Efficiency through Communication in Competitive Coordination Games
Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University View citations (4)
Journal Articles
2013
- SIMULTANEOUS DECISION-MAKING IN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS
Economic Inquiry, 2013, 51, (2), 1311-1323 
See also Working Paper (2012)
2012
- Behavioral spillovers in coordination games
European Economic Review, 2012, 56, (2), 233-245 View citations (2)
See also Working Paper (2011)
- Fight or Flight?
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012, 56, (6), 1069-1088 View citations (3)
2011
- A generalized Tullock contest
Public Choice, 2011, 147, (3), 413-420 View citations (3)
See also Working Paper (2010)
- CONTEST DESIGN: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
Economic Inquiry, 2011, 49, (2), 573-590 View citations (18)
See also Working Paper (2009)
- Endowment effects in contests
Economics Letters, 2011, 111, (3), 217-219 View citations (11)
See also Working Paper (2009)
- Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
Economics Letters, 2011, 112, (2), 216-219 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper (2010)
2010
- Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35, (2), 175-197 View citations (15)
See also Working Paper (2009)
- Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study
Journal of Public Economics, 2010, 94, (9-10), 604-611 View citations (9)
See also Working Paper (2010)
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 68, (2), 731-747 View citations (20)
See also Working Paper (2009)
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