Details about Susan Snyder
Access statistics for papers by Susan Snyder.
Last updated 2020-03-08. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: psn1
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Working Papers
2013
- Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham View citations (6)
Also in Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham (2013) View citations (4) Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society (2004) View citations (6)
See also Journal Article Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2013) View citations (4) (2013)
Journal Articles
2013
- Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, 49, (6), 471-477 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games, Discussion Papers (2013) View citations (6) (2013)
2004
- Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2004, 40, (1-2), 1-40 View citations (41)
- Observable implications of equilibrium behavior on finite data
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2004, 40, (1-2), 165-176 View citations (7)
- Scientific Progress and Lessons for Institutional Design
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2004, 63, (1), 183-187
2000
- The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2000, 16, (2), 269-305 View citations (16)
1999
- Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision
Journal of Public Economics, 1999, 71, (1), 97-119 View citations (23)
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