Details about Marie-Claire Villeval

Access statistics for papers by Marie-Claire Villeval.

Last updated 2009-06-20. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pvi52

Working Papers

2009

1. Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and in the Laboratory
   Post-Print, HAL
2. Hidden Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: An Experiment
   Working Papers, FEDEA

2008

3. Competition and the Ratchet Effect
   IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
   Also in Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2008)
   Post-Print, HAL (2008)
4. Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in
   University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara
5. Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort?
   Post-Print, HAL
6. Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence
   CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE
   Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2006) View citations
7. Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence
   IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) View citations
   Also in Post-Print, HAL (2008) View citations
   Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2008) View citations
8. Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation
   Post-Print, HAL
   Also in Working Papers, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics (2008)
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2008)
9. Punishment, inequality, and welfare: a public good experiment
   Post-Print, HAL View citations
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2008)
10. Responsabilité individuelle et fiscalité
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL

2007

11. COMPETITION, HIDDEN INFORMATION, AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENT
    University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara
    Also in Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2006)
    Post-Print, HAL (2006)
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2006)
    Economics Working Papers, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía (2006) View citations
12. Cooperation, Competition, and Risk Attitudes: An Intergenerational Field and Laboratory Experiment
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) View citations
    Also in Post-Print, HAL (2007) View citations
13. Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure View citations
    Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2007) View citations
    Post-Print, HAL (2007) View citations
    Post-Print, HAL (2007) View citations
14. Experimental Economics: Contributions, Recent Developments, and New Challenges
    Post-Print, HAL
    Also in Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2007)
    Post-Print, HAL (2007)
15. Individual Responsibility and the Funding of Collective Goods
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL
    Also in CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2007)
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL (2007)
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2007)
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2007)
16. Tax Evasion and Social Interactions
    Post-Print, HAL View citations
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2004) View citations
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2004) View citations
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2004) View citations
    Post-Print, HAL (2004) View citations
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2005) View citations
    Post-Print, HAL (2004) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2007)
17. Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?
    Post-Print, HAL View citations
    Also in Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2007)
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2007)
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2007)
18. The Peter Principle: An Experiment
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Also in Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2007)
    Post-Print, HAL (2007)
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University (2007)

2006

19. Effort Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
    Post-Print, HAL View citations
20. Effort and Comparison Income: Survey and Experimental Evidence
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure View citations
    Also in PSE Working Papers, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) (2006) View citations
    Post-Print, HAL (2006) View citations
21. Effort, revenu et rang: une étude expérimentale
    Post-Print, HAL
22. Human Capital over the Life Cycle
    Post-Print, HAL
23. Punishment, Inequality and Emotions
    Post-Print, HAL
    Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2006)
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2006)
    Post-Print, HAL (2006)
24. Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure View citations
    Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2006) View citations
    Post-Print, HAL (2006) View citations

2005

25. Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University
    Also in Post-Print, HAL (2004)
    Post-Print, HAL (2004) View citations
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2004) View citations
    IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2004) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2008)
26. Male and Female Competitive Behavior - Experimental Evidence
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure View citations
    Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2005) View citations
    Post-Print, HAL (2005) View citations
27. Male and Female Competitive Behavior: Experimental
    Post-Print, HAL View citations
28. Nouvelles conditions de travail: satisfaction ou résignation ?
    Post-Print, HAL
29. The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations
    Post-Print, HAL
    Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2005)
    Post-Print, HAL (2005)
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2005)

2004

30. Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay - An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
    Post-Print, HAL View citations
    Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2004) View citations
    Post-Print, HAL (2004) View citations
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure (2004) View citations
31. Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students
    Post-Print, HAL View citations
    Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2004) View citations
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO (2003) View citations
    Artefactual Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website (2004) View citations

2002

32. Leadership in Teams: Signaling or Reciprocating ?
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL View citations
33. Redesigning Teams and Incentives: A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO
    Also in Post-Print, HAL (2002)

2001

34. Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL
    See also Journal Article in Experimental Economics (2003)
35. Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence
    Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL View citations
36. Learning from Strike
    CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO
    Also in Post-Print, HAL (2001)
    See also Journal Article in Labour Economics (2004)
37. Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
    Post-Print, HAL View citations
    Also in Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics (2001) View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2003)
38. New Organizational Forms, Learning and Incentive-Based Inequality
    Post-Print, HAL

1999

39. Union Bargaining Strength as a Public Good: Experimental Evidence
    Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim View citations

Journal Articles

2008

1. Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 63, (1), 56-76 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2005)
2. Performance-pay, sorting and social motivation
   Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, 68, (2), 412-421
   See also Working Paper (2008)
3. Punishment, inequality, and welfare: a public good experiment
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 31, (3), 475-502 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2008)

2007

4. Tax evasion and social interactions
   Journal of Public Economics, 2007, 91, (11-12), 2089-2112 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2007)

2006

5. Human Capital over the Life Cycle: A European Perspective Edited by Catherine Sofer
   The Economic Record, 2006, 82, (257), 234-235

2004

6. Learning from strikes
   Labour Economics, 2004, 11, (2), 243-264
   See also Working Paper (2001)

2003

7. Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?
   Experimental Economics, 2003, 6, (3), 253-272 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2001)
8. Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
   American Economic Review, 2003, 93, (1), 366-380 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2001)

1995

9. Labour market contracts and institutions -- a cross-national comparison: (Elsevier Sciences Publishers B.V., Amsterdam, 1993) pp. vi + 456, ISBN 444-89927-8, US $98.50/Dfl. 185.00
   Labour Economics, 1995, 2, (3), 326-329