Details about Markus Walzl

Access statistics for papers by Markus Walzl.

Last updated 2009-09-25. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pwa84

Working Papers

2009

1. Farsighted House Allocation
   Harvard Business School Working Papers, Harvard Business School
2. Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
   Harvard Business School Working Papers, Harvard Business School

2008

3. How Ego-threats Facilitate Contracts Based on Subjective Evaluations
   Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
4. Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
   Harvard Business School Working Papers, Harvard Business School View citations
   Also in Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (2006)
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2009)
5. Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2007

6. Dynamic Recontracting processes with Multiple Indivisible Goods
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
   Also in CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2007) View citations
7. On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox
   CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich
   Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2006)
8. Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
   See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2008)
9. The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)
   UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
   Also in Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (2007)
10. The impact of the irrelevant – Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in online auctions
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
11. Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2006

12. On the Evolution of Trading Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
13. Why it Pays to Conceal - On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2005

14. Quid-Pro-Quo or Winner-Takes-It-All? An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Programs and Lessons to Learn for EU and US Policies
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization

2004

15. Unfair Contests
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
16. When should principals acquire verifiable information?
    Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations

2002

17. When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps
    Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany

Journal Articles

2009

1. Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
   Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2009, 45, (7-8), 422-434
   See also Working Paper (2008)

2008

2. Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
   Economics Letters, 2008, 101, (2), 148-150
   See also Working Paper (2007)

2006

3. Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2006, 162, (2), 277-290 View citations

2005

4. Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values
   International Tax and Public Finance, 2005, 12, (3), 265-279 View citations
5. The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent-Model
   Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), 2005, 57, (1), 29–45

2004

6. Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news?
   Economics Letters, 2004, 82, (1), 77-82 View citations
7. Self-reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement when there are Criminal Teams
   Economica, 2004, 71, (283), 333-348 View citations