Details about Shuguang Zhu
Access statistics for papers by Shuguang Zhu.
Last updated 2026-05-10. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pzh741
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Working Papers
2022
- First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition
CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany 
Also in TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2022)  ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (2022) 
See also Journal Article First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell (2025) (2025)
- On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms
Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
Also in TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2021) View citations (7)
See also Journal Article On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association (2022) View citations (4) (2022)
2021
- Type-contingent Information Disclosure
TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) View citations (4)
Journal Articles
2025
- First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2025, 34, (4), 889-898 
See also Working Paper First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition, CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series (2022) (2022)
2023
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, 212, (C) View citations (6)
2022
- On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, 14, (4), 494-514 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms, Post-Print (2022) View citations (1) (2022)
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