Details about Shuguang Zhu
Access statistics for papers by Shuguang Zhu.
Last updated 2026-05-10. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pzh741
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Working Papers
2022
- First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition
CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany 
Also in ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (2022)  TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2022) 
See also Journal Article First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell (2025) (2025)
- On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms
Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
Also in TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2021) View citations (7)
See also Journal Article On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association (2022) View citations (4) (2022)
2021
- Type-contingent Information Disclosure
TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) View citations (4)
Journal Articles
2025
- First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2025, 34, (4), 889-898 
See also Working Paper First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition, CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series (2022) (2022)
2023
- Private disclosure with multiple agents
Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, 212, (C) View citations (6)
2022
- On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, 14, (4), 494-514 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms, Post-Print (2022) View citations (1) (2022)
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