RECIPROCAL BROKERED DEPOSITS AND BANK RISK

Sherrill Shaffer

CAMA Working Papers from Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University

Abstract: Economic theory predicts that reciprocal brokered deposits, by facilitating an extension of deposit insurance coverage, may exacerbate moral hazard and reduce market discipline for banks, permitting them to take more risk in various dimensions. Using a newly available dataset, this note explores empirical evidence related to that hypothesis.

JEL-codes: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2010-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Reciprocal brokered deposits and bank risk (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:een:camaaa:2010-15

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