Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure
Bennedsen Morten and
Sven Feldmann
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Bennedsen Morten: Copenhagen Business School & University of Chicago
Business and Politics, 2002, vol. 4, issue 2, 1-18
Abstract:
This paper analyzes how the structure of the legislature affects interest groups' incentives to lobby. Lobbying is modelled as the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-member legislature, and the effectiveness of lobbying lies in the ability of information to change the winning policy coalitions. We show that with a long enough time horizon for policymakers, the distinguishing feature between the U.S. Congress and European parliamentary systems--the vote of confidence procedure--reduces an agenda setter's willingness to change policy coalitions, and thus significantly lowers the incentives for interest group lobbying.
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:4:y:2002:i:2:n:6
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DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1038
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