Flood Insurance and Government: 'Parasitic' and 'Symbiotic' Relations

Colin Green and Edmund Penning-Rowsell
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Colin Green: Flood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex University, Queensway, Enfield, London
Edmund Penning-Rowsell: Flood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex University, Queensway, Enfield, London

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 2004, vol. 29, issue 3, 518-539

Abstract: To be effective, flood insurance appears to require a partnership between the insurers and government: interdependence rather than independence. Relations between government and the insurance industry appear to lie on a continuum from the 'parasitic' to the 'symbiotic'. Changing circumstances appear to be pushing insurers and government apart, including the competition regulations that outlaw standard products. At the same time, insurers are making more demands on government for flood defence investment, so as to limit their liabilities. In parallel, government is becoming more and more concerned that insurance is not universal, and the socially excluded are those who suffer. As the insurance industry increases its demands for greater government intervention and policy change, it is in danger of becoming more like a parasitic extension of government, rather than retaining its autonomy and the ability to maximize its profitability within a more carefully crafted symbiotic relationship. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (2004) 29, 518–539. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0440.2004.00301.x

Date: 2004
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