Financial policymaking after crises: Public vs. private interests

Orkun Saka, Yuemei Ji () and Paul De Grauwe

No 10/2021, BOFIT Discussion Papers from Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT)

Abstract: We first present a simple model of post-crisis policymaking driven by both public and private interests. Using a novel dataset covering 94 countries between 1973 and 2015, we then establish that financial crises can lead to government interventions in financial markets. Consistent with a public interest channel, we find post-crisis interventions occur only in democratic countries. However, by using a plausibly exogenous setting -i.e., term limits- muting political accountability, we show that democratic leaders who do not have re-election concerns are substantially more likely to intervene in financial markets after crises, in ways that may promote (obstruct) private (public) interests.

Keywords: Financial crises; reform reversals; democracies; term-limits; special-interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G28 P11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg and nep-his
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/240388/1/dp2110.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Financial Policymaking after Crises: Public vs. Private Interests (2021)
Working Paper: Financial Policymaking after Crises: Public vs. Private Interest (2020)
Working Paper: Financial policymaking after crises: public vs. private interests (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bofitp:bdp2021_010

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