Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games

Vincent Anesi

No 2007-09, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: This note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann- Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do so, we study Markov perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games. The following result emerges from such an exercise: Every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of undominated Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game, which form a strategically stable set of equilibria, when voters are suficiently farsighted; thus establishing a relationship between vN-M stability and strategic stability in voting games.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining; committee; strategic stability; stable set. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games (2010)
Working Paper: Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2007-09

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