Common reasoning in games

Robin Cubitt and Robert Sugden

No 2008-01, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: This paper makes three related contributions to noncooperative game theory: (i) a solution concept (the “ICEU solution”), which is generated by an iterative procedure that constructs trinary partitions of strategy sets and deals with problems arising from weak dominance; (ii) a class of models of players’ reasoning, inspired by David Lewis’s work on common knowledge, which can together represent common knowledge of rationality for any consistent conception of individual practical rationality; and, using these ingredients, (iii) a diagnosis of paradoxes associated with the concept of common knowledge of rationality, as represented in Bayesian models of games.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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