On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations

Tobias Guse, Burkhard Hehenkamp and Alex Possajennikov ()

No 2008-06, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The focus is on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. The conditions are based on properties of the payoff function that generalize the constant-sum property and the ”smallness” property, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and non-atomic, anonymous, or large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples of Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Evolutionary stability; Finite populations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations (2010)
Working Paper: On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2008-06

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