Cooperation and Punishment under Uncertain Enforcement

Sergio Sousa ()
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Sergio Sousa: School of Economics, University of Nottingham

No 2010-06, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: This paper investigates the efficacy of a punishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Experimental studies have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt behaviour deemed as socially acceptable. Yet, our experiment shows that a sanctioning system cannot promote cooperative behaviour if enforcement is a low-probability event and free-riding behaviour is not often punished. This supports the view that punishment needs to be exercised to be feared, otherwise the simple threat of it cannot be effective in promoting cooperation.

Keywords: uncertain enforcement; public good game; altruistic punishment; decisionmaking under uncertainty; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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