First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model

J. Philipp Reiss and J.R. Schoendube

No 3, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2007-01-01
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Journal Article: First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2007003

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2007003

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