Subgame-perfection in stochastic games with perfect information and recursive payoffs

J. Flesch, J. Kuipers, G. Schoenmakers and K. Vrieze
Additional contact information
J. Flesch: RS: GSBE ETBC, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
J. Kuipers: Externe publicaties SBE
G. Schoenmakers: RS: FSE DKE NSO, Wiskunde
K. Vrieze: Externe publicaties SBE

No 41, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2008-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2008041

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2008041

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