Strategic commitment and cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

Matthew Embrey, Friederike Mengel and Ronald Peeters

No 51, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2012-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2012051

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2012051

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