Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation

Arijit Mukherjee and Enrico Pennings

No 05-109/4, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'International Journal of Industrial Organization' , 29(2), 232-41.

Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions. Unions have a clear preference for centralization only if productivity improvements are relatively small.

Keywords: Licensing; downstream market; upstream market; innovation; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Unionization structure, licensing and innovation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050109

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