Are Economic Agents Successful Optimizers? An Analysis through Service Strategy in Tennis

Franc J.G.M. Klaasen () and Jan Magnus
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Franc J.G.M. Klaasen: Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Franc Klaassen

No 06-048/2, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We consider the question whether top tennis players in a top tournament (Wimbledon) employ an optimal (efficient) service strategy. We show that top players do not, in general, follow an optimal strategy, and we provide a lower bound of the inefficiency. The inefficiency regarding winning a point on service is on average at least 1.1% for men and 2.0% for women, leading to a possible increase of income for the efficient player of 18.7% for men and 32.8% for women. We use these findings to shed some light on the question whether economic agents are successful optimizers.

Keywords: Inefficiency; Frontier; Optimal strategy; Tennis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C15 D01 D21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05-22
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060048

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