Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models with a Single Capital Stock

Engelbert Dockner and Florian Wagener

No 06-055/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in Economic Theory , 2014, 56(3), 585-625.

Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary conditions that allow us to characterize Markov perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE) for these games. These conditions result in an auxiliary system of ordinary differential equations that helps us to explore stability, continuity and differentiability of MPNE. The techniques are used to derive detailed properties of MPNE for several games including the exploitation of a finite resource, the voluntary investment in a public capital stock, and the inter-temporal consumption of a reproductive asset.

Keywords: Capital accumulation games; Markov equilibria; Resource games; Differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D92 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06-22
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Markov perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock (2014)
Working Paper: Markov=Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models With a Single Capital Stock (2013)
Working Paper: Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock (2008)
Working Paper: Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models With a Single Capital Stock (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060055

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