Limiting Limited Liability

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

No 06-070/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Limited liability may result in inefficient accident prevention, because a relevant portion of the expected harm is externalized on victims. This paper shows that under some restrictive conditions further limiting liability by means of a liability cap can improve caretaking.

Keywords: insolvency; judgment proof; liability; bankruptcy; liability cap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K32 L59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-08-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060070

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