Will Corporate Tax Consolidation improve Efficiency in the EU ?
Albert Van der Horst (),
Leon Bettendorf () and
Hugo Rojas-Romagosa
Additional contact information
Leon Bettendorf: CPB
No 07-076/2, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
Abstract:
The European Commission favours the introduction of a consolidated corporate tax base to overcome the distortions arising from the existing system of separate accounting. The blueprints for consolidation are simulated with the applied general equilibrium model CORTAX. We show that the benefits of a common consolidated tax base are limited due to two weaknesses. Formula apportionment, which is needed to allocate the consolidated taxable profits across jurisdictions, creates for MNEs new tax planning possibilities to exploit tax rate differentials in the European Union. In addition, it triggers tax competition as the incentives for member states to attract foreign investment by reducing their tax rates are enforced. The second weakness arises from the unlevel playing field, which is introduced if only part of the firms chooses to participate in the consolidation. The gains from consolidation can be fully grasped if it is obliged for all firms and accompanied by harmonisation of the tax rate.
Keywords: corporate tax; consolidation; formula apportionment; European Union; applied general equilibrium model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 H21 H25 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09-24
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)
Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/07076.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Will corporate tax consolidation improve efficiency in the EU? (2007) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20070076
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().