Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management

Josse Delfgaauw and Robert Dur

No 08-097/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper has led to a publication in the 'Journal of Public Economics' . The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy's best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is always highest in the private sector. As a result, relatively many of the more able managers self-select into the private sector. Since this outcome is efficient, our analysis implies that attracting a more able managerial workforce to the public sector by increasing remuneration to private-sector levels is not cost-efficient.

Keywords: Public Management; Public Service Motivation; Managerial Ability; Self-Selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H83 J24 J3 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Managerial talent, motivation, and self-selection into public management (2010)
Working Paper: Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management (2010)
Working Paper: Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080097

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