A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects

Arantza Estévez-Fernández
Additional contact information
Arantza Estévez-Fernández: VU University Amsterdam
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arantza Estévez Fernández

No 09-090/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan. Ifthe project is expedited, a reward arises. Analogously, a penalty arises if the project is delayed. This paper considersthe case of arbitrary nondecreasing reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay, respectively.Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a correspondingcooperative project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward (penalty). In the definition ofproject games, surplus (cost) sharing mechanisms are used to take into account the specific characteristics of thereward (penalty) function at hand. It turns out that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games.This relation allows us to establish the nonemptiness of the core of project games.

Keywords: Project planning; delay; expedition; cost sharing mechanism; surplus sharing mechanism; bankruptcy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/09090.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090090

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().