Default Risk Premia on Government Bonds in a Quantitative Macroeconomic Model

Falko Juessen, Ludger Linnemann and Andreas Schabert
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Ludger Linnemann: TU Dortmund University

No 09-102/2, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper examines the pricing of public debt in a quantitative macroeconomic model with government default risk. Default may occur due to a fiscal policy that does not preclude a Ponzi game. When a build-up of public debt makes this outcome inevitable, households stop lending such that the government has to default. Interest rates on government bonds reflect expectations of this event. There may exist multiple bond prices compatible with a rational expectations equilibrium. We analyze the conditions under which expected default risk premia can quantitatively rationalize sizeable spreads on public bonds. Sovereign default risk premia turn out to emerge at either very high debt to output ratios, or if the variance of productivity shocks is large.

Keywords: Sovereign default; asset pricing; fiscal policy; government debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E62 G12 H6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: DEFAULT RISK PREMIA ON GOVERNMENT BONDS IN A QUANTITATIVE MACROECONOMIC MODEL (2016)
Working Paper: Default Risk Premia on Government Bonds in a Quantitative Macroeconomic Model (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090102

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