The Trust Game behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences

Jana Vyrastekova and Sander Onderstal

No 10-063/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are slightly more "trustworthy". However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate transfers. For a given high level of pro-social preferences, men send more than women. This may be linked to men willing to bear more risk than women.

Keywords: trust game; experiment; strategy method behind the veil of ignorance; gender differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences (2005)
Working Paper: The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100063

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