Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement
Ajay Bhaskarabhatla (bhaskarabhatla@ese.eur.nl) and
Enrico Pennings
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Ajay Bhaskarabhatla: Erasmus University Rotterdam
No 12-010/2, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
Abstract:
We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facing uncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensive disclosures and patents by IBM during 1955-1989. Our results indicate that stronger antitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions are disclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative but less successful mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D.
Keywords: Antitrust; Defensive Disclosure; Patent; IBM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L40 M10 O32 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-09
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Working Paper: Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120010
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