A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover

Arantza Estévez-Fernández, María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Manuel Alfredo Mosquera and Estela Sánchez- Rodríguez
Additional contact information
Arantza Estévez-Fernández: VU University Amsterdam
María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro: Vigo University
Manuel Alfredo Mosquera: Vigo University
Estela Sánchez- Rodríguez: Vigo University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arantza Estévez Fernández

No 12-012/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissiblegame and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromiseadmissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional stable allocations capturedby an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity ofthe core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; compromise admissible games; bankruptcy; core cover; complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: A bankruptcy approach to the core cover (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120012

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