A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
Rene van den Brink (jrbrink@feweb.vu.nl),
Gerard van der Laan and
Nigel Moes
No 12-050/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
Abstract:
This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory' , 2014, 148, 2737-2748.
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph.
Keywords: implementation; cycle-free graph game; tree game; hierarchical outcome; average tree solution; weighted hierarchical outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Journal Article: A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120050
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