Social Relations and Relational Incentives

Robert Dur and Jan Tichem
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Jan Tichem: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 12-054/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium.

Keywords: Altruism; spite; social relations; incentives; relational contracts; efficiency wages; subjective performance evaluation; Nash bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 J33 M52 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-16
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Relations and Relational Incentives (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120054

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