On the Merits of Meritocracy

John Morgan, Dana Sisak and Felix Vardy

No 12-077/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful.

Keywords: career choice; promotion competition; selection; meritocracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J45 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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