Can European Bank Bailouts work?

Dirk Schoenmaker and Arjen Siegmann
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Dirk Schoenmaker: Duisenberg School of Finance, VU University Amsterdam
Arjen Siegmann: VU University Amsterdam

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Cross‐border banking needs cross‐border recapitalisation mechanisms. Each mechanism, however, suffers from the financial trilemma, which is that cross‐border banking, national financial autonomy and financial stability are incompatible. In this paper, we study the efficiency of different burden sharing agreements for the recapitalisation of the 30 largest banks in Europe. We consider bank bailouts for these banks in a simulation framework with stochastic country‐specific bailout benefits. Among the burden sharing rules, we find that the majority and qualified‐majority voting rules come close to the efficiency of a bailout mechanism with a supranational authority. Even a unanimous voting rule works better than home‐country bailouts, which are very inefficient.

Keywords: Financial Stability; Public Good; International Monetary Arrangements; International (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F33 G28 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Can European bank bailouts work? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120111

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