Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games

Rene van den Brink (), Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki () and Boram Park
Additional contact information
Boram Park: Rutgers University

No 12-136/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the CIS-value, and its dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value. We provide several characterizations using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.

Keywords: TU-game; equal division solution; CIS-value; ENSC-value; population solidarity; consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games (2016)
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