Strategic Wage Bargaining with Destructive Power: The Role of Commitment

Paola Manzini

Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We built a simple alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the players can commit to damage the "pie" they are bargaining over. The unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.

Keywords: BARGAINING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9617

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