Bayesian Utilitarianism

Lin Zhou

No 1996011, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper I consider social choices under uncertainty. I prove that any social choice rule that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, translation invariance, and weak anonymity is consistent with ex post Bayesian utilitarianism

Date: 1996-04-01
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