Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement When Firms Self-Regulate

Pierre Fleckinger () and Matthieu Glachant

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Does self-regulation improve social welfare? We develop a policy game featuring a regulator and a firm that can unilaterally commit to better environmental or social behavior in order to preempt future public policy. We show that the answer depends on the set of policy instruments available to the regulator. Self-regulation improves welfare if the regulator can only use mandatory regulation: it reduces welfare when the regulator opts for a voluntary agreement. This suggests that self-regulation and voluntary agreements are not good complements from a welfare point of view. We derive the policy implications, and extend the basic model in several dimensions.

Keywords: Self-Regulation; Negotiation; Regulation Preemption; Voluntary Agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-00529632v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2011, 62 (1), pp.41-52. ⟨10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.002⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-00529632v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate (2011)
Working Paper: Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement When Firms Self-Regulate (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00529632

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().