Interaction sheaves on continuous domains

Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding ()
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Hans Keiding: UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider game forms with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding (2003).

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium; solvability; effectivity; acyclicity; Equilibre de Nash; équilibre fort; résolubilité; acyclicité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00289299v1
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Published in 2008

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Related works:
Journal Article: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2008)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2008)
Working Paper: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00289299

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