Bargaining over public goods

Julio Dávila, Jan Eeckhout and Cesar Martinelli

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.

Keywords: alternating offers; Public goods; bargaining; alternating offers.; Biens publics; négociations; offres alternées. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00289435v1
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Published in 2008

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining Over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over Public Goods (2009)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
Working Paper: Bargaining over public goods (2008)
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