Heterogeneous Lobbying Efficiency

Julien Vauday

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on the relationship between exposure to the competition and the level of protection. The ability of lobbies to achieve a more favorable policy is then directly related to the reaction of their welfare to the policy. This monotonic relationship contradicts the idea that all lobbies do not have the same efficiency. Indeed, this efficiency cannot be uniquely driven by the exposure to competition. This paper proposes an original approach of the lobbying activity taking into account that lobbies' efficiency is heterogeneous. Just as there are some skilled and unskilled cards players. This paper highlights two types of efficiency, the passive and the active. First, according to the sensitivity of the government to the policy, two lobbies equally affected by the policy may pay different contributions to obtain the same protection level. Second, if the active efficiency is introduced, then two lobbies exhibiting the same sensitivity to the policy may obtain two different equilibrium policies.

Keywords: heterogeneous efficiency; Endogeneous policy decision; strategic lobbying; heterogeneous efficiency.; Politique endogène; lobbying stratégique; efficacité hétérogène. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00331298v1
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Published in 2008

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Working Paper: Heterogeneous Lobbying Efficiency (2008)
Working Paper: Heterogeneous lobbying efficiency (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00331298

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