Are Small countries leaders of the European tax competition ?

Nicolas Chatelais and Mathilde Peyrat ()
Additional contact information
Mathilde Peyrat: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ESSEC Business School

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the literature dealing with strategic fiscal behaviours of small EU countries using estimations of tax reaction functions of competing national governments. Deriving a simple model of tax competition in a Nash and Stackelberg game, we use panel data and tools from spatial econometrics to examine the role of small countries in tax competition within the enlarged European Union. We find that interactions are stronger among smaller EU countries than between larges ones and rates set in small countries influence those in big countries. Finally, small countries located in the centre of the EU have more influence on tax policies choices of big countries than small countries located in the periphery of EU.

Keywords: Strategic interactions; tax behaviours; spatial econometrics; European Union; tax competition; small countries.; small countries; Union Européenne; fiscalité; comportements stratégiques; économétrie spatiale; concurrence; fonction de réponse. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00332479
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in 2008

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00332479/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Are Small countries leaders of the European tax competition ? (2008)
Working Paper: Are small countries leaders of the European tax competition? (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00332479

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().