From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century

Monique Florenzano

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision through market or market-like institutions.

Keywords: free-rider problem; incentive compatibility; general equilibrium; Lindahl-Foley equilibrium; Wicksell public competitive equilibrium; private provision equilibrium; mechanism design; équilibre public compétitif; équilibre de provision privée; équilibre de Lindahl; compatibilité des incitations individuelles; problème du passager clandestin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00367859
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Published in 2009

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Related works:
Working Paper: From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century (2009)
Working Paper: From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century (2009)
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