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The Structure of Unstable Power Systems

Joseph Abdou

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: A power system is modeled by an interaction form, the solution of which is called a settlement. By stability we mean the existence of some settlement for any preference profile. Like in other models of power structure, instability is equivalent to the existence of a cycle. Structural properties of the system like maximality, regularity, superadditivity and exactness are defined and used to determine the type of instability that may affect the system. A stability index is introduced. Loosely speaking this index measures the difficulty of the emergence of configurations that produce a deadlock. As applications we have a characterization of solvable game forms, an analysis of the structure of their instability and a localization of their stability index in case where solvability fails.

Keywords: Interaction form; effectivity function; stability index; Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium; solvability; acyclicity; Nakamura number; collusion; Interaction; pouvoir; cycle; stabilité; équilibre de Nash; nombre de Nakamura (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00392515v1
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Published in 2009

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Working Paper: The Structure of Unstable Power Systems (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: The Structure of Unstable Power Systems (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: The Structure of Unstable Power Systems (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: The Structure of Unstable Power Systems (2009) Downloads
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