Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information

Nicolas Jacquemet () and Adam Zylbersztejn ()

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper reports experimental results from a one-shot game with two Nash equilibria: the first one is efficient, the second one relies on weakly dominated strategies. The experimental treatments consider three information-enhancing mechanisms in the game: simple repetition, cheap-talk messages and observation of past actions from the current interaction partner. Our experimental results show the use of dominated strategies is quite widespread. Any kind of information (through learning, words or actions) increases efficiency. As regards coordination, we find that good history performs better than good messages; but bad history performs worse than bad messages.

Keywords: Coordination game; cheap-talk; Jeu de coordination; communication; observation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07-22
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00505164v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information (2013)
Working Paper: Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information (2013)
Working Paper: Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information (2013)
Working Paper: Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information (2013)
Working Paper: Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information (2010)
Working Paper: Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00505164

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