Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

Pauline Contou-Carrère () and Tristan Tomala
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Pauline Contou-Carrère: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

Keywords: Finitely repeated games; semi-standard monitoring; folk theorem; Jeux finement répétés; signaux semi-standards; folk théorème (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00524134v1
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Published in 2010

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Related works:
Journal Article: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2011)
Working Paper: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2010)
Working Paper: Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00524134

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