Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design

Monique Florenzano

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problems, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the negative conclusion of the impossibility of a fully decentralized optimal public goods provision throught market or market-like institutions.

Keywords: general equilibrium; Lindahl-Foley equilibrium; Wicksell-Foley public competitive equilibrium; private provision equilibrium; mechanism design; free-rider problem; incentive compatibility; principal-agent models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00531464
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Published in European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2010, 17 (4), pp.1047-1077. ⟨10.1080/09672567.2010.499469⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
Working Paper: Government and the provision of public goods: from equilibrium models to mechanism design (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00531464

DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2010.499469

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