Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking

Jenny Helstroffer and Marie Obidzinski

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper develops a regulatory competition model to study whether and how refugee law should be centralized, and what are the consequences for refugees and for host countries. Varying refugee flows across countries lead some destinations to adopt strict measures. The resulting externality leads to a generalized "race to the bottom" of asylum law. Neither fixed nor minimum standard harmonization are found to be in the interest of both host countries. Especially the most popular destinations like EU border countries would suffer from losing discretion. However, minimum standards would benefit refugees and less popular destinations.

Keywords: Competition in law making; Asylum law; European law; Flexible law; Human rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00447157v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2010, 30 (1), pp.86-97. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2009.09.004⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00447157v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking (2010)
Working Paper: Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00447157

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2009.09.004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().