Strategic inputs into patent pools

Justus Baron () and Henry Delcamp
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Justus Baron: CERNA i3 - Centre d'économie industrielle i3 - Mines Paris - PSL (École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris) - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - I3 - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This article explores what factors determine the decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.

Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-00488272v1
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Published in 2010

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